Georgi, Fabian (2010): For the Benefit of Some: The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and its global migration management. In: Martin Geiger / Antoine Pécoud (Hg.): The Politics of International Migration Management. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 45-72.

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For the Benefit of Some: The International Organization for Migration and its Global Migration Management

Fabian Georgi

Introduction

On 8 August 2003 a few hundred activists of the Sixth Anti-racist Border Camp in Germany made their way from their tents in the Rhine meadows in Cologne to nearby Bonn. Here they demonstrated in front of the office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), an intergovernmental organization with 127 member states and an annual budget of more than 1 billion US Dollars (USD) in 2008. Its central motto is 'Managing Migration for the Benefit of All' (IOM, 2008a). The demonstrators contested this. For them, IOM always acted 'in the interests of governments and against autonomous migration and unwanted refugees' (Anti-racist Border Camp, 2003, p. 3, translation F.G.). The rally was the finale of a 2-year campaign under the slogan 'Stop IOM! Freedom of movement versus global migration management' organized mainly by the Noborder Network, comprised of leftist and immigrant groups from different European countries. A day of action in October 2002 targeted the IOM offices in Berlin, Vienna, and Helsinki. During the G8 summit in Evian in May 2003 so-called anti-globalization activists demonstrated outside the IOM headquarters in Geneva, hurling stones. Police reacted with tear gas (interview No Border activist, 25.04.2009). At the same time, the NGOs (non-governmental organizations) Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) denounced IOM for violating the rights of migrants: 'Our research and the research of colleague organizations [...] has revealed a range of ongoing IOM activities that appear to obstruct, in whole or in part, the rights of the very people IOM is tasked with assisting' (HRW, 2003, p. 3; cf. Amnesty International/Human Rights Watch, 2002). For a while, IOM was at the centre of a critical inquiry on practices and implications of international migration control. Since then IOM has avoided the spotlight.

This chapter takes IOM's claim to 'benefit all' as the starting point for a re-engagement. Migration management, IOM claims, can produce win-win-win situations: 'Well managed migration can enhance development and progress in ways that profit both origin and destination lands as well as individual migrants and their families' (McKinley, 2006). The sharp criticism directed against IOM by leftist organizations, migrant groups, NGOs and academics makes it clear that the beneficiaries of IOM's activities are not so easily established. The aim of the chapter is, therefore, to answer the cui bono question: IOM migration management – for the benefit of whom?

This chapter will address its question from a historical and a materialist perspective. It employs concepts from neo-Gramscian international political economy (cf. Jessop, 1990; Morton, 2007; Gill, 2008) and insights from the current debates on a materialist theory of the internationalization of the state inspired by the writings of the French-Greek theorist Nicos Poulantzas, a disciple of Louis Althusser (cf. Bretthauer et al., 2010). Beyond theoretical catchphrases, such an approach carries with it at least one central assumption relevant to the question of this chapter: it is not sensible to speak and think indiscriminately, as IOM often does, of benefits to 'countries of origin', to 'countries of destination' or to 'migrants' as a whole. Instead societies, and also migrants, are divided deeply by partly antagonistic contradictions of class, but also of gender, race, citizenship or education. Thus an answer to the cui bono question must be framed with regard to the material dynamics, historical conditions and social struggles that underlie these contradictions and divisions.

The chapter is divided into three sections: The first section gives a brief introduction to IOM, its current structure and activities, and provides a brief sketch on the state of research of the organization. The second and main part describes the historical development of IOM and its migration management concept. It focuses on IOM as an institution and contextualizes it within wider economic and political processes. The third part addresses the apparent contradictions between IOM's practices and rhetoric by analyzing in more detail its financing mechanisms. It then interprets IOM's migration management discourse as part of a political project that struggles over hegemony in international migration policy. The chapter will conclude with three hypotheses that form a preliminary answer to its central question: IOM migration management – for the benefit of whom?

IOM: Structure, practices and state of research

Today, IOM is the second-largest intergovernmental organization in the field of migration (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] is bigger). As of February 2010 it had 127 member states with a further 17 states and 77 NGOs and IGOs as observers. It has more than 440 field locations and about 7000 staff members that work on around 2000

projects all over the world. The IOM claims to provide flexible services 'to address the migratory phenomenon from an integral and holistic perspective [...] in order to maximize its benefits and minimize its negative effects' (IOM, 2007, p. 6). Unlike UNHCR, however, IOM is not part of the UN system and not legitimized or mandated by international law. Thus some NGOs and academics stress that IOM has 'no protection mandate' (Amnesty International, 2003, p. 8) and no 'normative authority' (Betts, 2008, p. 6), meaning that the organization is structurally responsible only to its member states' governments and is acting in their interest. Thus, IOM is a deeply ambivalent organization. This is demonstrated, too, by the contradictory variety of its activities which may be divided into five categories (cf. IOM, 2009a):

(1) *The IOM supports the movement of emigrants, migrant workers and resettled refugees*: Based on its traditional activities in the post-war period the organization supports emigrants, migrants and refugees in a direct way. It advises emigrants and migrant workers before and after their travel, sells discounted airline tickets and offers language courses. It transports people from refugee camps to (Western) host countries; it places migrant workers with employers abroad, and develops systems for simplified remittances of wages.
(2) *The IOM builds up the capacities of states for migration control*: Under the label of capacity-building for migration management IOM conducts training seminars for civil servants, politicians or border guards. It offers practical advice on migration policy and drafts laws and administrative guidelines for its member states. In this way IOM helps states to expand, and often to build up in the first place, the political, institutional and cultural conditions and bureaucratic capacities for migration control.
(3) *The IOM itself takes a role in operative migration control*: IOM assumes an operative role in the control of migration in all of its phases: With so called 'mass information campaigns' comprising posters, press or TV adverts, IOM tries to deter people from irregular migration or warn them of the dangers of 'trafficking' (cf. Nieuwenhuys/Pécoud, 2007). With concrete policy-relevant studies, IOM produces the knowledge that state institutions need to adapt their controls to the changing tactics of migration movements. After people have crossed a border, they might be received in reception, detention or deportation camps run by IOM in conjunction with the local authorities, for example, in Indonesia or the Ukraine. When states try to expel unwanted persons from their territory (rejected asylum-seekers, illegalized workers, victims of 'trafficking'), IOM conducts (much criticized) 'assisted voluntary return' programmes, in which people receive financial assistance if they 'voluntarily' return to 'their home countries' (cf. Human Rights Watch, 2007, pp. 5–6).

(4) *The IOM is a competitor in the humanitarian market place*: In close cooperation with UNHCR and other agencies, IOM takes part in humanitarian emergency operations after natural disasters and (civil) wars. Here, IOM is mostly in charge of rapid evacuations and the transportation of people and goods. Starting in the 1990s, these operations have partly expanded into long-term reconstruction and development projects, for example, after the 2004 tsunami in Asia. In 2008 these activities comprised 55 per cent of IOM's operational budget (including the resettlement of refugees). This kind of operation, however, has been controversial among IOM's member states because, as some members claim, IOM is straying away from the core tasks laid down in its Constitution.

(5) *The IOM engages with discursive practices in the struggles over hegemony in international migration policy*: IOM conducts various knowledge practices with which the organization takes part in the discursive political struggles over the direction of international migration policy. Each year IOM publishes dozens of policy briefs, research reports, magazines and books; a major example is the World Migration Report (IOM, 2003b). Its staff members take part in academic conferences as participants and speakers, thereby blurring the boundaries between academic and governmental knowledge production. The organization often functions as the secretariat for government-led conference processes at the regional and global level and it takes part as observer in major intergovernmental conferences inside and outside the UN system, issuing its own political statements.

With the concept of 'migration management', IOM attempts to hold these very different activities programmatically and strategically together (cf. Georgi, 2009). According to IOM, migration management can achieve four key goals: maximize the economic growth potential of migration (*migration and development*), facilitate and assist the legal migration of tourists, students and legal labour migrants (*facilitating migration*), combat unwanted and illegal immigration (*regulating migration*) and keep forced migration movements under control and help refugees and displaced persons (*forced migration*) (IOM, 2009a).

At the top of the organization's structure stands a Director General (DG), a position that – with one exception – has always been occupied by US officials, who often come from the diplomatic service of the US State Department (IOM, 2009c). The DG is elected by the IOM Council. It meets twice a year and each member state has one vote. He reports to the Council and the smaller Executive Committee with 33 member state representatives. He additionally directs the activities of the local IOM missions worldwide and heads the different headquarter departments, among them 'Migration Management Services', 'Migration Policy and Research', 'Operations Support' and 'External Relations'.

To finance its basic infrastructure, like the headquarters in Geneva, IOM receives annual assessed contributions by its member states, calculated according to their different economic strengths. The overwhelming majority of this operative budget is financed by rich industrialized countries. Thus in 2008 the G7 countries alone accounted for 72 per cent of the organization's core budget of 33.4 million USD (IOM, 2009b, pp. 25–7). The bulk of the budget, however, was always collected by project grants or fees for the use of IOM's services. In 2008 the top ten donor countries (Western states plus Japan and the US allies Peru and Colombia) provided around 67 per cent of the operative budget (IOM, 2009b, p. 43). In the last decade the gap between the administrative budget of regular contributions and the rapidly growing operative budget has increasingly widened. According to the annual financial reports, the administrative budget in 2000 still comprised 7.2 per cent of the whole budget. By 2008 this number had halved to about 3.4 per cent.

Given the size of IOM and the controversies surrounding it, the state of research on the organization is surprisingly weak. Existing secondary literature includes: a few older and scattered studies on different aspects of IOM (cf. Perruchoud, 1989, 1992); a monograph published by IOM itself on the event of its 50th anniversary (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001); and several descriptions that were written in the context of the heightened sensibility and suspicion towards IOM around 2003 (Amnesty International/Human Rights Watch, 2002; Amnesty International, 2003; Düvell, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2003; Antirassismusbüro Bremen 2004). Only in the last few years have more detailed studies shed greater light on some aspects of IOM's work (among them Nieuwenhuys/Pécoud, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2007; Betts, 2008; Geiger 2008; Georgi, 2009; ICMC, 2009; Schatral 2009; see also Christensen, 2009). The present chapter aims to contribute to this growing body of literature. It builds on the existing secondary literature as well as 'grey' sources (i.e. IOM's annual reports, financial reports, public meeting notes, etc.) and on data gathered during 12 semi-structured interviews with IOM staff members and representatives of UNHCR and different NGOs. It presents the preliminary results of an ongoing research project, thereby offering its arguments as a provisional starting point for further debate.

The historical development of IOM and the migration management project

The Cold War decades: An anti-communist logistics agency

The following part describes the historical development of IOM and locates it within broader social, political and economic processes and conflicts. While the first sub-section sketches IOM's history in the Cold War decades, the focus lies on its development since the 1980s, which is then analyzed in the four following sub-sections.

The organization we know today as IOM was founded in 1951 as the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movements of Migrants from Europe (PICMME). It was founded in December 1951 at a conference in Brussels, only a few weeks after UNHCR was established. Both were successor organizations to the International Refugee Organization (IRO) that was charged with assisting the millions of refugees and displaced persons uprooted by Second World War. The United States, and especially its conservative congressional majority, saw the UNHCR and the International Labour Organization (ILO) – which also tried to become active in labour migration programs – as potentially uncontrollable and under communist influence. Therefore, the US government initiated the founding of another, competing organization, PICMME, a Western counter-institution to the UNHCR and ILO, and during the first decades after its founding, also an anti-communist logistics agency for emigration and refugee transport. PICMME's constitution stipulated that only countries who supported the principle of 'free movement' could become members, thereby excluding Eastern Bloc states that prohibited the emigration of their citizens. In October 1952, it was renamed the International Committee for European Migration (ICEM), a name it would bear for nearly 30 years. The organization's original 16 members included western European countries, from which emigrants left, and their new home countries in North and South America, as well as Australia. Its stated task was to organize the emigration of the so-called 'over-population': persons displaced by the war, many former inmates of German concentration camps, unemployed workers, and later, refugees from Eastern Bloc countries (Perruchoud, 1989, pp. 502–5; Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, pp. 14–19; Loescher, 2001, pp. 57–62; Christensen, 2009, pp. 61–2).

These early activities of ICEM were limited mainly to logistics, focusing on only a few rather technical programmes. ICEM's founding members had originally assumed that the organization would only exist temporarily as it was expected to complete its task to support the emigration of the European 'over-population' within a few years. But once it had been established, the momentum of a bureaucracy, fighting for its own survival during the changing historical circumstances, made ICEM a more permanent apparatus (Perruchoud, 1989, p. 505; Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, pp. 19–21). Instrumental in the continuation of ICEM was the decision taken by many people from eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to leave the Eastern Bloc. ICEM was given the additional role of running reception camps for these refugees, who fulfilled an important propagandist function in the Cold War, and organizing their transport to Western host countries. Then in 1956, the Hungarian Uprising and its following repression allowed ICEM to prove its continued usefulness to Western governments. The organization quickly began a massive relief effort for dissidents, who were fleeing from the tanks in the streets of Budapest and the waves of arrests. ICEM organized immediate relief

and later resettlement for about 180,000 persons (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, pp. 36–41; Christensen, 2009, pp. 63–71).

From the early 1960s onwards, however, ICEM experienced a severe crisis. The relief effort for Hungarians was completed. The fortifications at the inner-German border and the western border of Czechoslovakia and Hungary and, above all, the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 decreased considerably the number of refugees from Eastern Bloc countries. And the 'Golden Age' (Eric Hobsbawm) of Western capitalism, with full employment and expanding welfare states, greatly reduced the number of western Europeans deciding to leave the continent for an uncertain future in the unstable countries of South America. Thus, economic growth and the 'iron curtain' threatened ICEM's institutional existence. Its necessity was questioned by, among others, the governments of Canada and Australia. Both countries left the organization in 1962 and 1973 respectively. The two states' governments claimed that it was unnecessary and even unwelcome to have an international organization dealing with a deeply national topic like immigration (Holborn, 1963; Hawkins, 1991, pp. 161–3). ICEM's response was to expand into new areas (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, pp. 44–69): it initiated the 'Selective Migration to Latin America' programme that aimed to support development through the immigration of highly-skilled migrants from Europe. It began for the first time to organize research projects and international seminars on migration issues. Finally, the organization managed to break out of its confinement to Europe as it became useful in managing the massive refugee flows that resulted from the repression of what Immanuel Wallerstein has called the 'world revolution of 1968' (Wallerstein, 2004, pp. 84–5), referring to the crushing of the Prague Spring in August 1968 by Soviet tanks, the Pinochet coup against the socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile in September 1973, and the thousands of Vietnamese and Cambodian boat people, fleeing the consequences of the Vietnam War after the fall of Saigon in April 1975. In all of these (and other) cases, ICEM cooperated closely with UNHCR and other agencies to provide transportation and resettlement services from non-European countries to mostly Western host states (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, pp. 54–62).

But while ICEM managed to secure its basic institutional existence, its political status remained precarious. In the mid-1970s, Director General John F. Thomas failed to convince sceptical member states to make ICEM a permanent and more secure organization by reforming its constitution (cf. Perruchoud, 1989, pp. 506–7; interview IOM staff, 21.09.2009). The compromise that emerged at the time was an unofficial name change in 1980: the reference to Europe was dropped and Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) would be the organization's name in the following 9 years. It was only during the 1980s that yet again the changing historical conditions ensured the agency's institutional existence and the massive growth and expansion that were to come later.

The IOM's historic opportunity: Post-Fordist globalization and the breakup of the Eastern Bloc (1980s–1993)

A comprehensive reform of the ICM came into force on 14 November 1989, following years of internal conflicts between member states and by a strange coincidence, taking place only 5 days after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was renamed International Organization for Migration (IOM), received from its member states an extended, broader mission and was transformed formally into a permanent body, symbolized in the name shift from a 'committee' to an 'organization'. Its official mandate was widened considerably. The IOM was now given the task of promoting the organized transfer and the regulated mobility of migrants, migrant workers, refugees, displaced persons and other individuals in need of international migration services. Research and conference activities were to be strengthened and the membership increased (Perruchoud, 1989, p. 508; Perruchoud, 1992; Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, pp. 88–91).

With this reform, Western states responded to dramatic changes in migration processes. The onset of the world economic crisis in 1973 was the historical starting point for this development. In terms of regulation theory (cf. Gill, 2008), the global recession of 1973 was the final crisis of the Fordist mode of regulation of Western post-war capitalism, characterized by class compromises and relatively strong workers' movements. The restructuring of this mode of regulation in the next two decades was accompanied – especially in Western Europe – by the end of active recruitment of migrant workers and political attempts to block and prevent further immigration. Traditional immigration countries (i.e. the United States, Canada and Australia) made the entry of refugees and migrants increasingly difficult or more dependent on economic criteria. However, the political forces that supported reduced immigration (conservatives, as well as trade unions and social democrats) were defeated – in part due to capital factions representing economic sectors that profited from continuing immigration, especially if precarious or illegalized, but also due to the relative 'autonomy of migration' itself (cf. Kanak Attak 2004; Papadopoulos et al., 2008): movements of migration that had established themselves in the post-war period could not be turned off like a water tap. People continued to move, using new means: family reunification, asylum, tourist visas or irregular border crossings.

Additionally 'neoliberal reforms' (deregulation, privatization, financialization and free trade, later summarized in the Washington Consensus) were pushed through in bitter political battles from the 1970s onwards. They created the conditions for even greater international mobility. Western European states established the Common Market, the G7 countries and transnational corporations promoted the globalization of production and trade, and capital markets were largely deregulated (cf. Harvey, 2004, 2007; Klein, 2008). In short, the 'accumulation strategy' (Jessop, 1990, p. 198) of intensified economic globalization increased the international mobility of

labour. In large parts of the so-called developing world, millions of people reacted with community-supported migration projects to the 'shock strategy' (Naomi Klein) of International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs that followed the debt crisis of the early 1980s. Economic reforms and the political manipulation of crises resulted in an 'accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey, 2004): People could no longer survive as smallholder farmers in competition with international agribusinesses. Millions were driven from their lands, or lost jobs after public companies became privatized, public sector spending was reduced, or when 'uncompetitive' firms could no longer survive after their local markets were opened to Western transnational corporations. Thus, as a reaction to the establishment of a new, intensely globalized accumulation regime and its 'neoliberal' mode of regulation, millions of people began to move from villages to cities and from peripheral countries to capitalist core regions.

The post-War migration control apparatuses of Western industrialized countries, among them ICEM/ICM, were no match for these new migration movements that flexibly adapted to new political regulations by subverting or circumventing them. Moreover, different capital factions and political forces within the industrial countries disagreed sharply over tightened migration controls. These conflicts often resulted in lax enforcement and the tacit, if controversial, acceptance of immigration as long as migrant workers and refugees were actively illegalized by state policies (cf. Genova, 2002). In this situation in the 1980s, Western countries began to establish dozens of new institutions for migration control and migration research and exhibited for the first time a serious interest in international cooperation in the field. Thus, the reform and expansion of ICM/IOM was a part of a complex process in which hegemonic forces in Western industrialized countries tried to shift the balance of forces between their migration control capacities, on the one side, and the mobility strategies that populations, movements and individuals employed as a reaction to 'neoliberal' reforms on the other.

The implosion of the Eastern Bloc from 1989–91 and, thereby, the disappearance of the migration blockade within Europe accelerated and intensified these processes, the consequences of which gave IOM a historic opportunity. The organization provided Western states with studies and statistics on new East-West migration routes and background information on movement processes, mostly described together as 'smuggling and trafficking' (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, p. 166). Starting in 1992, IOM established in rapid succession offices and projects in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries, including Albania and Romania, which were regarded by Western governments as particularly unstable (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, pp. 117–20). Next to the end of the Cold War, the First Gulf War in 1990/91 was the single most important event at that time for IOM's subsequent expansion. The IOM prevailed over a politically weakened UNHCR and was made lead agency by the United Nations to support nearly one million migrant workers who had fled

after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Loescher, 2001, p. 267). At the time, the major Western donor countries of UNHCR were unhappy with what they considered a too liberal position in what they perceived to be an escalating 'asylum crisis' (Loescher, 2001, p. 247).

The IOM and UNHCR have a long history of rivalry about competencies and government money and a general animosity growing from conflicting political assignments and philosophical worldviews (interview UNHCR staff, 05.10.2009). For IOM, the Gulf War signified a big moment as the organization engaged for the first time with many Middle Eastern countries, to which migrant workers had fled to from Kuwait, and with other home countries in South Asia and other regions. Many of these countries had previously viewed IOM with suspicion, seeing it as a tool of the US government (interview IOM staff, 05.05.2009). Shortly thereafter, several of these countries became IOM members, for example, Egypt (1991) and Pakistan (1992), or they joined as observers like India (1991), Jordan (1992) and Iran (1993). As a further result of IOM's constitutional reform and its active involvement in the Gulf Crisis, it acquired official observer status at the United Nations (in 1992) and was formally involved in the coordination of UN humanitarian operations.

Steady growth and collection of experiences in the crisis of migration control (1994–2000)

The early 1990s witnessed a burst of Western migration control activities: asylum laws were tightened with the concept of safe third countries; visa requirements were introduced for almost all developing countries; border controls were strengthened, leading to the death of thousands of people seeking a better life or a safe haven in Western countries. New research centres, state institutions and international organizations were founded, among them the European intergovernmental organization of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in 1993 (cf. Georgi, 2007), the Brussels-based think tank Migration Policy Group in 1995 and the International Metropolis Network in 1996. Existing institutions like IOM were also strengthened. Thus, while the IOM annual budget was almost stable from 1990 to 2000 (around 280 million USD), the organization doubled its membership from 39 to 79 in the same period. The new members from Europe, Africa, the Middle East and also Asia slowly opened 'new markets' for its services. The IOM consequently expanded into new areas of activity; for one, its research and policy functions were strengthened. The 'fight against illegal migration' and 'trafficking' also became completely new areas of activity. Under the label of 'capacity-building' IOM was active in the construction and modernization of state apparatuses for migration control, especially in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS countries (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, p. 106). At the same time, IOM became engaged by states and the United Nations in humanitarian operations worldwide, for example, after the civil wars in Mozambique, Tajikistan, Bosnia and Haiti

(Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, pp. 146–61). Within the IOM membership, these operations were – and to a certain degree still are – very controversial. Advocates of a strengthened IOM were set against states that wanted IOM to focus on the traditional areas of IOM's 'expertise', or areas of more direct interest to themselves (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, p. 134; interview IOM staff, 02.10.2009).

Migration policy was debated with greater intensity in a whole series of regional forums, among them the Budapest and the Puebla Process, the large annual IOM Seminars and within the European Union. But IOM and other actors of the emerging international migration policy community considered the asylum laws, visa regulations and border controls established in the 1980s and early 1990s to be partially ineffective, badly coordinated, and too focused on walling-off Western countries, especially in Europe (cf. Georgi, 2007, pp. 33–5). Experts spoke about the 'global migration crisis' (Weiner, 1995), lamenting Western policies as ineffective and incoherent. They argued for an approach to migration that aimed to utilize the economic benefits that regulated migration could bring to industrial countries. Thus, in the 1990s migration became, for the first time, a relevant topic in international diplomacy at a global level and within the United Nations. Evidenced, for example, in its involvement at the UN International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo (cf. Purcell, 1994), IOM became very much involved in these processes. Shortly after this, the controversial Commission on Global Governance made migration one of its topics and engaged IOM adviser Bimal Ghosh to suggest the contours of a new international migration regime (Ghosh, 1995). Subsequently, some developing countries called for a UN world conference on migration as part of the series of major UN conferences at the time. Industrial countries, however, were strictly opposed to this idea, fearing that to debate such a 'sensitive' topic in a UN framework would lead to escalating conflicts between them and the Global South. Consequently, they delayed the political drive to hold such an official, high-level conference within the UN framework for over a decade. Partly as a reaction to this, IOM tried strategically to establish so-called regional consultative processes (RCPs) (interview IOM staff, 21.09.2009; interview UNHCR staff, 05.10.2009; cf. Hansen, 2010). RCPs are explicitly informal, government-led processes of conferences and workshops in which governments (and sometimes IGOs and NGOs) share information on migration movements, try to find partial consensus on regional migration policies and initiate cooperative projects. The IOM became the secretariat for some RCPs or supported them in an informal way, as with the Puebla Process in the Americas or the Colombo Process in South Asia (cf. Thouez/Channac 2006; Hansen, 2010). This regional approach became a hallmark for IOM's work, helping the organization to acquire contacts and new projects. It has been criticized, however, for its lack of transparency and de-democratizing working pattern (Overbeek 2002, p. 12; Betts, 2008, pp. 13–14).

It was in this economic and political context that the term 'migration management' emerged, first as a diffuse catch word. Then the term was used from 1997–2001 as a key concept within the IOM project New International Regime for the Orderly Movement of People (NIROMP). The aim of the project, coordinated by IOM adviser Bimal Ghosh, was to sketch out the contours of a binding international regime in which all forms of international mobility would be comprehensively managed in a coherent and efficient way on the basis of (primarily) economic criteria. A series of workshops was organized and reports were written. The book *Managing Migration: Time for a New International Regime* (Ghosh, 2000a) was the central result of the project. It helped to popularize the migration management concept: From around 2000, it was used by IOM in virtually all of its statements and publications, and in countless capacity-building projects and training seminars. While certainly not alone, IOM can be seen as the single most important actor in anchoring the migration management concept with its diffuse technocratic and economic notions into the emerging global elite consensus on migration policy. The emergence of the migration management concept must be understood, however, within the wider context of an increasing hegemony of 'managerial' concepts over many areas of public and even private life. The 1990s marked the decade in which the protagonists of 'New Public Management' became influential in shaping state practices. Migration policy was only one field. Other examples include education management, water management, or security management. With countless guidebooks on efficient time-, self- and stress-management, the managerial mindset became inscribed deeply in individual subjectivation processes (cf. Boltanski/Chiapello, 2007). It should come as no surprise that migration also came to be understood by politicians, bureaucrats and academics as something that could and ought to be managed.

IOM on the offensive: The McKinley era (2000–08)

Massive growth and expansion

The years from 1999–2001 marked the transition to a new phase in IOM's history. The demand by governments for IOM's services in migration control was greater than ever. The dominant strategies for economic and political transformation of the previous two decades continued to let millions of people choose international mobility as a counter-strategy over harsh social and political conditions. In Europe the experiences of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, the temporary dominance of centre-left governments, the upcoming Eastern EU enlargement and the strengthened role of the European Commission in migration control after the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere Programme created favourable conditions for IOM's further expansion. From 1998 to 2008 IOM's membership almost doubled from 67 to 125 (China and Russia remain only observers as of February 2010). The

number of field offices more than tripled from 119 to about 400. The annual budget quadrupled from about 240 million USD to more than one billion. And the number of employees increased nearly sixfold from about 1100 to over 6000, with 196 working in the Geneva headquarters (Swing, 2008, p. 8). A quote from the 2002 annual report highlights the optimism of those years:

> Services expanded into new geographical territory, new offices were opened and existing offices were strengthened. New areas for priority action were identified and existing areas of migration management given new life and dimension. Existing partnerships were enhanced and new ones formed. IOM's role as provider of policy advice and a forum for discussions [...] was confirmed and enhanced.
>
> (IOM, 2003a, p. 1)

This expansion was not only the outcome of favourable conditions. It was also to a large degree the result of a deliberate growth strategy initiated by the new IOM Director General Brunson McKinley, who had succeeded James N. Purcell in October 1998 (Betts, 2008, p. 9; interview IOM staff, 05.05.2009). McKinley, a former US ambassador to Haiti, conducted an offensive strategy of IOM expansion in new regions and fields of activity, thereby marking a new chapter in IOM's history. Despite all the changes in the previous decade, IOM maintained its traditional focus on transport logistics and highly-qualified emigration programmes until the end of the 1990s. Under McKinley these traditional activities were pushed to the sidelines (IOM, 2002, p. 1). New areas of work were established that had little to do with IOM's former activities or for that matter with migration; one example is the IOM-coordinated German compensation programme for former forced labourers from 2000–06. The new 'business areas' established during the 1990s gained further monetary and strategic relevance: the 'fight' against human 'trafficking' and 'illegal migration', the establishment of state institutions to control migration, and the so-called 'voluntary repatriation' of rejected asylum seekers or illegalized workers (often forcible deportation out of detention camps for those affected was the only alternative; cf. Human Rights Watch, 2007, pp. 5–6). Finally, IOM became more and more engaged in emergency and post-conflict operations, not least after the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. New management techniques aimed to make the work of the organization more cost effective, more flexible and faster. And like a transnational corporation, IOM decentralized its structure and shifted the departments of accounting, human resources, IT services and others from the Geneva headquarters to the low-wage locations in Manila (from 2002) and Panama (from 2007) (cf. IOM, 2009d, pp. 75–8).

Another strategic shift initiated by McKinley was to intensify IOM's relations with other actors in international migration policy. From the late 1990s

a whole series of new bodies was created for this purpose. In 1999 IOM created an Academic Advisory Board. In 2005 the Business Advisory Board (BAB) was established. It organized five meetings between the leadership of IOM and 17 current and former CEOs and senior managers of TNCs, like the UK-based Manpower Inc. or the International Organization of Employers (IOE) (IOM, 2010a). As of February 2010, 77 IGOs and NGOs had joined IOM as observer members. Among those that joined were NGOs that had previously been critical of IOM, like AI and HRW. In 2003 IOM initiated the foundation of the Geneva Migration Group, an informal body of six IGOs located in Geneva. The aim was to improve the cooperation between UN agencies and other IGOs dealing with migration issues through meetings of the respective heads of agencies.

While these and other initiatives certainly document the ambitions of IOM, scholars and political activists are well advised not to overestimate the Kafkaesque plurality of these structures: After some initial activity, IOM's Academic Advisory Board fell into disuse (interview IOM staff, 06.10.2009) and its Business Advisory Board had its last meeting in November 2007 (as of February 2010). With the end of McKinley's tenure as Director General, its future is uncertain (interview IOM staff, 02.10.2009). Most importantly, the Geneva Migration Group has run into severe problems after it was transformed into a much bigger body, the Global Migration Group, today comprising 14 IGOs. This shift was initiated by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2006 at the suggestion of the Global Commission of International Migration. But due to conflicting interests and political perspectives among the involved IGOs, many participants now consider it ineffective and without future in its current form (ICMC, 2009, p. 9; interview UNHCR staff, 05.10.2010).

The IOM in close combat: Struggles within and against the organization

The rapid growth of IOM was realized with an effectively stagnant basic administrative budget. Despite massively increased project grants, IOM's rich member states insisted upon a policy of 'zero nominal growth' of the administrative budget and refused to increase their regular annual contributions. Poorer countries often not did not pay at all or did so with much delay (e.g. IOM, 2002, p. 72). This resulted in heavy burdens of work for staff members and some dramatic situations. For example, in May 2002 IOM had to abruptly stop its commitment to Afghan refugee camps due to a lack of money (Dietrich, 2004). The staff was particularly affected by the uncontrolled growth. A report on a meeting of the IOM Executive Committee in 2005 records the staff's grievances:

> The Staff Association was increasingly concerned about the long-term risks of low staff morale, due largely to contradictory management

> decisions; the staff was paying the price for the successful growth of IOM. [...] staff morale and commitment [...] had reached unprecedented lows and a dangerous cynicism had begun to spread.
>
> (IOM, 2005, pp. 8, 10)

With its massive expansion, IOM also came under increasing political pressure. From 2001 on, AI and HRW criticized the violation of human rights by IOM. Among other points, they targeted the organization's programmes for 'voluntary assisted returns' and its involvement in the 'Pacific Solution' in which Australia detained asylum seekers on remote Pacific islands (Amnesty International/Human Rights Watch, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2003). Many NGOs were concerned that IOM had no 'protection mandate' established by international law and therefore lacked the structural independence and political will to protect refugees and displaced persons during conflict situations, such as in Sri Lanka or Darfur (cf. ICVA, 2004). Leftist groups contributed to this critique by making IOM the target of an international campaign, portraying the organization as the mastermind of global migration control and describing the agency's personnel using epithets such as 'spies and migrant hunters' (Noborder Network, 2002; Antirassismusbüro Bremen, 2004). The German Roma National Congress declared IOM to be its 'enemy' due to its ambivalent role in the compensation programme of former German forced labourers and its support for deportation of Roma people to Eastern Europe (Roma National Congress, 2001). While IOM rose in recognition and influence in international politics, its standing in civil society circles went through the floor.

Migration management: From a concrete project to a diffuse approach

While IOM expanded, its migration management project also changed its form. The NIROMP notions of migration management as a comprehensive binding regime were products of the 1990s and its post-Cold War Global Governance optimism. In 2001 the situation had changed: 'Humanitarian interventions' had failed in Somalia and had not even been attempted in Rwanda; the dotcom bubble had burst; the liberal euphoria about 'the end of history' was over. Above all, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the beginning of the War on Terror, neoconservative political forces gained increasing influence. The Bush Administration in the United States was not at all in favour of establishing global binding regimes or strengthening the United Nations. Thus, the experts – academics, politicians and factions within national and international state apparatuses that wanted to establish such a regime – were sidelined (interview IOM staff, 05.05.2009). Also within IOM, the understanding of migration management as envisioned in the NIROMP project were 'shelved' (interview IOM staff, 21.09.2009), at least officially. Migration management on a working level

meant something more pragmatic for IOM after 2001: It became a label for a rather diffuse and less specific direction in migration policy, holding its diverse and often contradictory services together.

Thus, instead of creating a binding regime, the 2000s saw a whole series of more informal global initiatives on migration that focused on sharing information and 'best practices'. Building on its expertise in regional consultative processes, IOM initiated similar processes on a global level. In 2001 the organization established the annual International Dialogue on Migration (IDM), which is part of the IOM Council meetings that take place each November, and supplemented with several workshops throughout the year. Also in 2001 IOM and the Swiss government started the Berne Initiative, a government-led global debating process, and produced its final report in 2004, titled 'International Agenda on Migration Management', and subtitled 'Common understandings and effective practices for a planned, balanced and comprehensive approach to the management of migration' (Berne Initiative, 2005). The tensions between the modest claim to offer nothing more than 'common understandings and effective practices' and the much grander aims of a 'planned, balanced and comprehensive approach' speak of the ongoing conflicts between the social and political forces that struggled over the future direction of international migration policy.

With these initiatives, IOM tried to put itself in the centre of the slowly emerging *informal* global migration regime. The organization, or at least its ambitious DG McKinley, was therefore not overly pleased about the institutional competition initiated by UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan in his second term of office after 2001. Annan, a former UNHCR employee, wanted to strengthen the UN's role in migration policy (interview UNHCR staff, 05.10.2009; interview IOM staff, 08.10.2009). Among other activities, he established the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), a body of academic and political experts, formally independent of the United Nations. Its 2005 final report, 'Migration in an Interconnected World', contained a series of important and often controversial recommendations; for example, a possible merger of UNHCR and IOM, a scenario to which both organizations were adverse (GCIM, 2005, pp. 75–6).

Then in September 2006, the UN General Assembly finally convened to debate the topic of 'migration and development'. This so-called High-Level Dialogue (HLD) was the culmination of the efforts towards a world conference on migration that had been going on since the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo. The HLD produced few tangible institutional results. However, the fact that migration could be openly debated on a global diplomatic level without the discussions erupting in antagonistic conflict was noted as a success (interview UNHCR staff, 05.10.2009). It also proved that the efforts of IOM and other actors since the early 1990s to create a global elite consensus on managed migration had not been completely unsuccessful. The continuation of the debate

that began at the HLD, however, was heavily contested. The United States and other industrial countries were still against debating migration within a UN framework. The final compromise was to convene a Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) outside the United Nations and without a permanent secretariat (Betts, 2008, p. 10). The annual GFMD meetings (2008 in Manila, 2009 in Athens, 2010 in Mexico) are limited to non-binding discussions and are described as mere 'talk-shop[s]' (cf. ICMC, 2009, p. 10).

Consolidation: IOM in post-neoliberalism

The year 2008 marked a new phase in IOM's history for two reasons (interview IOM staff, 21.09.2009). Most importantly, as of 1 October the organization was headed by a new DG: William Lacy Swing, a six-time US ambassador and former special envoy for the UN peace-keeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He was elected in June 2008, competing and winning against three other candidates. One of them was the former DG McKinley, who ran for a third term against the wishes of the US government (Nebehay, 2008; IOM, 2008b, pp. 3–6). Swing's strategy for IOM, as well as his tone, differs from that of his predecessor. In his first speech as DG to member states during the IOM Council meeting in November 2008, he addressed the different grievances that had accumulated during McKinley's term. He promised to take 'the organization's pulse' (Swing, 2008, p. 2) and listen more closely to the wishes of its member states and its staff. The IOM, he said, was 'ripe for change', and it was 'time for adjustment and consolidation' (Swing, 2008, p. 13). While not altering the organization's course, he seemed prepared to refocus IOM on its core mandate as a migration agency. The second reason for conceptualizing 2008 as a new phase in IOM's development is the outbreak of the world economic crisis. In his speech to member states in November 2008, Swing described the crisis as the 'Elephant in the Room' (Swing, 2008, p. 21) about which nobody knew for certain what he would do. While the crisis would not alter migration patterns profoundly, migrant workers would be severely affected. Additionally, the crisis would influence the migration policy priorities of IOM's member states, thereby also influencing the organization (Swing, 2008, pp. 21–30). Thus, while IOM's expansion and growth are unlikely to be as radical as in the 2000s, there are no signs that point towards a diminishing role for the organization in international migration control.

Contradictions of IOM migration management: Material dependence and relative autonomy

The historicization of IOM has made clear that the character, activities and political direction of the organization have shifted several times in the course of its development: It started as a small Western transport agency in the Cold War, went into a severe crisis in the 1960s, and only slowly

diversified its activities and its geographical reach in the turbulent times following the repression of the 'world revolution of 1968'. The IOM's chance for growth and expansion came in the 1980s and 1990s as its major Western donor states made the organization an element of their political reaction to the often unintended migration-related consequences of their 'neoliberal accumulation strategies' (cf. Jessop, 1990, pp. 198–201). The IOM's expansion, then, was part of an attempt on behalf of states to keep under control and harness the international movements with which millions of people, families and communities reacted to the accumulation strategies of intensified capitalist globalization and 'accumulation by dispossession'.

Still, IOM's image remains contradictory. On the one hand, the organization paints a positive image of migration. It speaks the language of migrant rights and claims to work towards 'humane and orderly migration regimes' that benefit all by creating win-win-win situations. On the other hand, its actual actions seem to be much harsher, drawing continued criticism from NGOs, academics and social movements. The organization appears to serve the hegemonic forces in industrialized countries in creating the bitter reality of migration controls characterized by thousandfold deaths at Western borders, by the mass illegalization of workers, and a world of detention camps and deportations. These contradictions cannot be explained alone by IOM aligning its rhetoric to the international human rights discourse, as has been suggested by HRW (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 2). Instead the differences between IOM's actions and its ideology should be understood as a contradiction between IOM's financial dependence on (mainly but not only Western) industrialized countries, primarily interested in control, and IOM as an international state apparatus and a large bureaucracy, which has its own political aims, strategic priorities and a relative autonomy from its member states. These factors will be briefly analyzed in the following two sub-sections.

The IOM's material basis: privatization of migration controls and projectization

The IOM's activities and general conduct are strongly influenced by its funding model. Like other public services (energy, water, communications, transportation, security, etc.) migration controls have been privatized and denationalized to differing degrees since the 1980s. In an outsourcing process, elements of reception and detention camps, health checks, the production of migration statistics or even of deportations have been transferred to NGOs, intergovernmental organizations and private companies. This transfer has been mediated by competition in different (partly non-profit) markets. For IOM, these markets are of even greater importance than for many other IGOs, since it does not even receive 4 per cent of its annual budget (in 2008) through the regular contributions of its member states. The administrative budget barely suffices to fund IOM's basic structure. The overwhelming share of 96 per cent was awarded to IOM by way of project

funding by individual states or other IGOs (IOM, 2009b, pp. 2, 43). The dependence on voluntary project grants has been further intensified by the introduction of an accounting method from the business world, called projectization or activity-based costing, after 1994. Projectization means that all 'staff and office costs associated with implementing a project are charged to projects through a time-allocation concept' (IOM, 2010b). Thus, unlike other IGOs, IOM cannot balance activities flexibly within a large regular budget. In practice, projectization implies that IOM is conducting those and only those activities that will definitely be financed by guaranteed project contributions from concrete donors. It might be compared to a company that produces only those goods that have been ordered in advance. Conversely, this means that staff and offices that are no longer financed by concrete projects will be laid off and closed. Thus, IOM is dramatically dependent on the successful acquisition of new projects to save the jobs of its 7000 employees (as of February 2010) and to maintain its influence (interview IOM staff, 02.10.2009). This dynamic creates an instrumental-rational logic that establishes the monetary value of a project as an independent and important factor in addition to its practical use-value or its normative justification. For example, many local IOM missions have no secured permanent funding. Thus, a head of missions is often responsible for constantly procuring new projects to save the jobs of the mission's staff members, along with his or her own job (interview IOM staff, 30.09.2009).

This funding model leads to IOM's strong dependence on its major donors: mostly Western governments of industrialized countries, which largely determine the activities that will be realized. Conversely, this dependence explains the general conduct of the organization: The organization prides itself on being 'entrepreneurial [and] cost-effective' (Swing, 2008, p. 11) and names as its 'Comparative Advantage[s]: Operational ethos; Speed of response; Efficiency of effort; [and] Effectiveness of result' (Swing, 2008, p. 38). The IOM operates and presents itself similarly to a private company. As a result, IOM is an actor that is relatively easy to work with for governments. Unlike many NGOs but also more 'normative' IGOs, like UNHCR or ILO, IOM never publicly criticizes its member states or donors (interview IOM staff, 02.10.2009). A consequence of this conduct is 'the perception that many NGOs (and others) have of IOM as an agency that will do anything as long as there's money with which to do it' (ICVA, 2004).

Struggles over international migration policy: IOM migration management as a hegemonic project

Moving forward from the material basis of IOM's activities to its rhetoric and politics, it is not easy to discern IOM's own political ambitions. Central reasons for this difficulty are IOM's professed apolitical, managerial values of efficiency, professionalism and entrepreneurship. Migration is mostly presented as a technical problem, a challenge – not as a political topic

associated with power struggles and diverging interests. For IOM there are 'policies and practices that have worked and those that have not' (IOM, 2006, p. 2). What previously was politics of migration, with all its connotations – principles, power, interests and conflicts – has been transformed into nondescript, apolitical migration management. By depoliticizing migration and migration control in this way, IOM also implicitly denies its own specific political and institutional interests, its structural and financial dependencies (cf. Ferguson, 1994). To overcome this apolitical view of migration control, it is helpful to distinguish the organized social forces (determined by class interests but also by gender, race and other social relations) with their political, intellectual and moral spokesmen that struggle over dominance in international migration policy (cf. Jessop, 1990, pp. 207–8; Morton, 2007). Without going into theoretical and empirical detail it might be said that there are at least three political projects that aspire to the status of a hegemonic project in international migration policy:

(1) The strongest one is possibly what might be called the national sovereignty project, probably supported by most governments of industrialized countries. These governments are the material densifications of the relationship of forces supporting the national-social welfare states (Balibar, 2004, pp. 68–9). While agreeing to the sharing of best practices and increased *informal* cooperation in migration control among states, this project stresses the continued centrality of nation-states' power to determine entry, stay and removal of non-citizens on their nationalized territories. The protagonists of this project are thus opposed to any binding international framework on migration and have consequently derailed the attempts to push forward a global governance of migration during the 1990s, as envisioned in IOM's NIROMP-project.
(2) A second broad project might be identified as the rights-based approach to migration. It might be said to range from social movements demanding a right to migration and global citizenship over the more radical NGOs like Migrant Rights International struggling for the adoption of the UN Convention on Migrant Workers' Rights (cf. Guchteneire et al., 2009) to progressive factions *within* some of the more 'normative' IGOs, like the ILO, UNHCR or UNDP. This project tends to privilege the individual rights of workers, migrants and refugees over nation-states' interest in control and technocratic schemes for a global management of migration. Therefore, this project might be said to materially densify the organized strategies of (mobile) populations, the working classes of developing countries, and the 'progressive-internationalist' forces within industrialized countries.
(3) The third project could be called liberal global migration governance. Advocates of this project, including IOM, envision a close international cooperation in migration policy and a binding, treaty-based,

even supra-national global regime. This project includes progressive notions of a more humane, just and open regulation of migration, while stressing that this can only be realized within a firm framework of migration governance or migration management. Besides various academics and experts in the international migration policy community, like Bimal Ghosh, Thomas Straubhaar, Theo Veenkamp or the late Jonas Widgren, many big NGOs and international organizations might be said to support this project – even if their donor-driven practices contradict it in part (cf. ICMC, 2009). Additionally, some governments of emigration countries, like Mexico and the Philippines, could be seen as belonging here.

Of course, these three broad projects are a simplification. All contain different and even contradictory positions and currents. Within the third project, the IOM version seems to be characterized by a strong emphasis on the possible economic benefits of migration (cf. IOM, 2007; IOM, 2010c). A central theme of IOM's statements is to end the economically inefficient blockade of migration as well as the tacit policy of mass illegalization of workers and to realize the growth potential of *managed migration*. IOM Director General Swing thus summarized the main challenge facing IOM's member states as: 'How to ensure that the world is better prepared to manage the human component of globalization constructively' (Swing, 2008, p. 33). Migration is seen as positive because and insofar as it is economically beneficial. Thus, the policy objectives of IOM include restrictive border controls and effective deportation systems. These are seen as necessary preconditions for the introduction of effective immigration regimes for the economically desirable and productive. This also includes a 'fair' integration policy and the protection of 'genuine' refugees and asylum-seekers in regional protection areas from which some might be resettled to industrialized countries. The central theme is to enhance the nation-state's capabilities to control unwanted migration to an extent that will make a 'regulated openness' (Ghosh, 2000b, p. 25) towards useful immigration politically feasible. In a pragmatic way, its current activities are understood as necessary steps towards this aim (interview IOM staff, 21.09.2009). The IOM version of migration management/governance privileges the economically-defined utility of mobile people over their rights, hopes and plans. This utilitarian rationality warrants, conceptualizing IOM as supporter of a *neoliberal* current in the global migration governance project.

Conclusion

As this chapter comes to an end: how can the question posed at the beginning be answered? IOM migration management – for the benefit of whom? As has been noted at the beginning, a comprehensive answer to this question

would need to involve more extensive empirical research on actual activities of IOM, especially 'in the field'. Given the rather weak state of research on IOM, however, it makes sense to conclude with three working hypotheses that might serve as starting points for further research and debate:

(1) *Migration management primarily benefits the hegemonic forces in IOM's major donor states, mostly Western industrialized countries*: Looking with a bird's eye view at IOM's history, it might be said that the organization was one of many instruments used by mainly Western governments to keep migration-related consequences of the central world's historical developments after World War II under control – and utilize them in their interest. The IOM was founded in 1951 to solve the problem of an unproductive and potentially unruly 'over-population' in Europe by facilitating overseas emigration. Soon it acquired a new role within the Cold War. It organized the reception and resettlement of Eastern European refugees who fulfilled a crucial ideological function in the Cold War as they 'proved' Western superiority in the ideological competition with the 'Communist Bloc'. From the 1960s onwards ICEM/ICM then became a useful tool to 'manage' the large refugee flows that resulted from the repression of the 'world revolution of 1968' in the CSSR, in Chile, Vietnam and elsewhere. Finally, from the 1980s onwards the organization's focus shifted again as it served the hegemonic forces in Western countries to control and harness the often unintended migration-related consequences of the accumulation strategies of intensified capitalist globalization and accumulation by dispossession.

It has to be stressed that IOM should not be interpreted as acting in the interest or for the benefit of 'the Western industrialized countries', nor simply in the interest of the governments of those countries. From the perspective of materialist state theory the state is not independent of the social forces struggling in society. Instead it is itself a battlefield for those forces. The state is, as Nicos Poulantzas put it, the material densification of relationships of forces in society (cf. Bretthauer et al., 2010). Thus, the respective hegemonic forces in a given period do not control the state directly as has been thought by orthodox Marxists. Instead the state has a relative autonomy. It has its own materiality and logic. This leads to a transformation and form-changing of social struggles that are fought out on the territory of the state. But because IOM is an international state apparatus it is a 'densification of the second order' (Brand et al., 2008): In its apparative materiality it densifies the relation of forces between its member states' governments and their national state apparatuses, whereby the national state apparatuses are already densifications of the relation of social forces in different national and regional settings. As a result, the practices of IOM migration management are conducted in the interest and for the benefit of the dominant or hegemonic social forces

in its major donor states, which are mainly Western industrialized countries. The hegemonic social forces in these capitalist countries (changing compositions of specifically gendered and racialized fractions of capital and organized labour) and their strategic priorities have of course shifted over the six decades of IOM's existence, thereby also transforming the organization and its functions.

(2) *Managing migration for the benefit of IOM itself*: However, IOM is not only a tool being used. The organization has, like any IGO, or any bureaucracy for that matter, its own dynamic. For a large part of its history it was fighting for secured and permanent institutional existence, and in general for increased influence and expansion. It was taking part in the social and political struggles with its own political and institutional interests and positions. The existence, growth and activities of IOM, then, should not be interpreted only as a result of its usefulness to the hegemonic forces in its Western industrial donor states, but also as the result of the IOM bureaucracy fighting for its own benefit: securing jobs and careers, achieving higher social status and political influence. In short, the operative and discursive practices of migration management benefit IOM in its form as a bureaucracy and relatively autonomous (international) state apparatus. Besides securing jobs for its staff, migration management also advances IOM's 'own' political project which can be described as neoliberal global migration governance.

(3) *Managing migration to the disadvantage of refugees, migrant workers and the subaltern classes of developing countries*: To give an answer to the question of who is benefiting from IOM migration management, it is also necessary to point out who is not. No doubt, on an individual basis, IOM has benefited many refugees and migrants by providing food, shelter, medical aid, advice or transport services. No doubt, on an individual level most IOM staff members genuinely want to 'help' migrants. While not denying benefits to individual persons, on a more fundamental level it may be argued that IOM is not acting for the benefit or in the interest of refugees and (potential) migrant workers.

Millions of refugees can't reach safety from persecution in Western liberal democracies because these have been surrounded by ever stricter, and ever further externalized border controls, supported by IOM capacity-building and constantly updated by its policy relevant research. The hopes of thousands of asylum-seekers have been crushed in IOM-run detention camps on Nauru, in Indonesia or in the Ukraine. In a similar way, millions of workers are being illegalized as a result of advice and laws drafted by IOM, and are further being deported 'voluntarily' through IOM's much criticized assisted voluntary return programmes. Finally billions of people in the developing countries who are not part of

local elites and who are not deemed to be exploitable as highly qualified workers are effectively imprisoned in 'their' homelands. Etienne Balibar has described this as a 'global apartheid' in which zones of limited mobility are created for the subaltern, 'dangerous' working classes. The world population is divided and distanced along class lines by the surveillance of movements, by border fences, detention camps and deportations – in short, by a system of migration management. The IOM participates in building and reproducing this system, partly because the organization serves the control-interests of the hegemonic forces in its major donor states, but also because its own neoliberal version of global migration governance implies the subordination of the rights, plans and hopes of individuals for a better life under abstract principles of economic utility and a technocratic belief in the 'management' of human mobility. As such, IOM manages migration for the benefit of only some.

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